BOOK REVIEWS CITADEL

Wednesday, February 10, 2010

HOME LAND SECURITY SERVICES OF PAKISTAN-VERY HIGH SECURITY ALERT IN PAKISTAN.



 

After the recent spate of suicide bombings in Pakistan,

the PPP Government of Pakistan has tightened security.

A new organisation called HOMELAND SECURITY SERVICES OF PAKISTAN has been created.






 


http://groups.yahoo.com/subscribe/smsbhai

 

__,_._,___

 


--
Man would indeed be in a poor way if he had to be restrained by fear of punishment and hope of reward after death."  --
Albert Einstein !!!

http://www.scribd.com/doc/22151765/History-of-Pakistan-Army-from-1757-to-1971

http://www.scribd.com/doc/21693873/Indo-Pak-Wars-1947-71-A-STRATEGIC-AND-OPERATIONAL-ANALYSIS-BY-A-H-AMIN

http://www.scribd.com/doc/21686885/TALIBAN-WAR-IN-AFGHANISTAN

http://www.scribd.com/doc/22455178/Letters-to-Command-and-Staff-College-Quetta-Citadel-Journal

http://www.scribd.com/doc/23150027/Pakistan-Army-through-eyes-of-Pakistani-Generals

http://www.scribd.com/doc/23701412/War-of-Independence-of-1857

http://www.scribd.com/doc/22457862/Pakistan-Army-Journal-The-Citadel

http://www.scribd.com/doc/21952758/1971-India-Pakistan-War

http://www.scribd.com/doc/25171703/BOOK-REVIEWS-BY-AGHA-H-AMIN

Tuesday, February 9, 2010

Hawks on the War path


 

Monday, February 8, 2010

DEBORCHGRAVE: Hawks on the warpath

Might Obama deploy military to solve economy?

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/feb/08/hawks-on-the-warpath/ 

By Arnaud de Borchgrave

"Clueless in Washington" was how the Economist, a British weekly read by movers and shakers the world over, headlined America's crisis in governance. Neither the president nor Congress shows any sign of knowing how to tackle the budget deficit.

A $1.6 trillion deficit for the current fiscal year, to be followed by $1.35 trillion for the 2011 budget and an authorized increase of almost $2 trillion in the national debt to $14.3 trillion is a road map for a fiscal catastrophe. The last half-trillion-dollar spending bill signed by President Obama included more than 5,000 earmarks worth about $7 billion - pork funds forced upon the executive by legislators in return for their votes.

Deficits between now and 2020 are forecast to add up to $30 trillion. The total amount of U.S. dollars in circulation worldwide (known by the Fed as M3): $14.3 trillion. Some financial and economic experts think the Obama administration's remedial measures thus far are tantamount to slightly rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. In his new book, "Freefall" (W.W. Norton & Co., 2010), Joseph E. Stiglitz, a member of President Clinton's Council of Economic Advisers, says, "In the Frankenstein laboratories of Wall Street, banks created new risk products without mechanisms to manage the monster they had created," while innovation simply meant "circumventing regulations, accounting standards and taxation."

Kevin Philips, whose latest book - "Bad Money: Reckless Finance, Failed Politics, and the Global Crisis of American Capitalism" (Viking, 2008) - is an equally devastating indictment, writes, "The financial industry will most likely block any far-reaching overhaul, even though it will not be able to put its own broken Humpty Dumpty back on the wall. That bleak conclusion may not be too far from what Joe Stiglitz himself thinks."

Mr. Obama is floundering as he tries to reset his presidency on economics. Defense is sacrosanct. Either taxes go up, or entitlements go down, or both. On Capitol Hill, it's still burned toast for the president.

For centuries, leaders faced with insuperable domestic problems found escape in foreign distractions. In some cases, the distractions occurred suddenly and fortuitously, such as World War II, which started in Europe and pulled America out of the Great Depression.

President Obama isn't looking for such a distraction, but others have no pangs illuminating what they think is the way out of the "clueless in Washington" dilemma. Right-wing scholar-activist Daniel Pipes, a neocon icon, could not be more blunt: President Obama can "save" his presidency by bombing Iran. The fact that this also could cost him the presidency is not deemed worthy of discussion.

Mr. Pipes is in good company. Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair now says the world may have to take on Iran as the mullahocracy and its Revolutionary Guards are more of a threat today than Iraq was when U.S. and British troops invaded in 2003. Mr. Blair, addressing a joint session of Congress, gave President George W. Bush a powerful oratorical assist on the historical need to destroy Saddam Hussein's regime and its nuclear and chemical weapons. There also was much disinformation about a purported alliance between Saddam and Osama bin Laden. At one stage, 60 percent of the American people believed the canard that Saddam had been behind the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks that killed 3,000 Americans.

While under questioning by a British panel investigating his decision to join the U.S. in the war against Iraq, Mr. Blair kept coming back to Iran - no less than 58 times. If Saddam hadn't been eliminated, Mr. Blair said, today Iraq and Iran would be competing in supplying weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups.

Mr. Pipes, a powerful voice in Israel's corner, says Mr. Obama "needs a dramatic gesture to change the public perception of him ... preferably in an arena where the stakes are high, where he can take charge, and where he can trump expectations." Such an opportunity now exists, to wit: "Obama can give orders for the U.S. military to destroy Iran's nuclear weapons capacity. It would have the advantage of sidelining health care, push Republicans to work with Democrats, make Tea Party-ers jump for joy, conservatives and neoconservatives would swoon ecstatically."

In 2003, President George H.W. Bush appointed Mr. Pipes to the board of the U.S. Institute of Peace. Today, he is part of a powerful lobby in Washington that pooh-poohs the repercussions predicted by the Iran war naysayers, a group that includes three former U.S. CENTCOM commanders. Gen. Anthony Zinni, one of the three, says, "If you like Iraq and Afghanistan, you'll love Iran." They can see how one bomb on Iran would trigger the theocracy's impressive asymmetrical retaliatory capabilities up and down the entire Persian Gulf - and beyond.

To reinforce the war party's arguments, Mr. Pipes also says that "the apocalyptic-minded leaders in Tehran" could eventually "launch an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack on the U.S., utterly devastating the country." His detractors dismiss EMP alarmism as flimflam. But they are wrong. EMP is a very real concern of those who ponder future asymmetrical threats.

In his latest book, "One Second After" (Forge, 2009), New York Times best-selling author William R. Forstchen looks at EMPs "and their awesome ability to send catastrophic shockwaves throughout the U.S. within seconds." One Scud-type nuclear missile, fired from the cargo hold of a freighter off the East Coast, set to explode 75 miles up, could fry everything electrical in one-third of the United States, from every cell phone and computer to aircraft, trains, vehicles, elevators, and the entire government, including the Pentagon.

Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak disappointed the war hawks by saying the inability to negotiate a peace deal with the Palestinians is a greater threat to the Jewish state than a nuclear Iran. National Security Adviser Gen. James L. Jones added that Israel is acting "responsibly" on Iran, and "we're working very closely with them."

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad suddenly cooed, too, offering the West its low-enriched (3.5 percent) uranium, then taking it back once enriched at 20 percent. Within 48 hours, Iran's chief obfuscator was barking again, announcing the production of highly enriched uranium at 20 percent and the building of 10 new enrichment sites in 2010. Weaponization requires 90 percent. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said he is certain Iran is going for the bomb and it's time for tough new sanctions. But Russia and China are not aboard.

Arnaud de Borchgrave is editor at large of The Washington Times and of United Press International.



--
Man would indeed be in a poor way if he had to be restrained by fear of punishment and hope of reward after death."  --
Albert Einstein !!!

http://www.scribd.com/doc/22151765/History-of-Pakistan-Army-from-1757-to-1971

http://www.scribd.com/doc/21693873/Indo-Pak-Wars-1947-71-A-STRATEGIC-AND-OPERATIONAL-ANALYSIS-BY-A-H-AMIN

http://www.scribd.com/doc/21686885/TALIBAN-WAR-IN-AFGHANISTAN

http://www.scribd.com/doc/22455178/Letters-to-Command-and-Staff-College-Quetta-Citadel-Journal

http://www.scribd.com/doc/23150027/Pakistan-Army-through-eyes-of-Pakistani-Generals

http://www.scribd.com/doc/23701412/War-of-Independence-of-1857

http://www.scribd.com/doc/22457862/Pakistan-Army-Journal-The-Citadel

http://www.scribd.com/doc/21952758/1971-India-Pakistan-War

http://www.scribd.com/doc/25171703/BOOK-REVIEWS-BY-AGHA-H-AMIN

What Should be Pakistans Afghan Policy

What Should be Pakistans Afghan Policy
 
A.H Amin

  1. i am based in afghanistan since 2003 and have travelled to all 35 provinces.
  2. whatever the USA or NATO may desire, may it be not inviting India or ignoring India , Russia,India and Iran as well as all five central asian republics, as well as Turkey (Uzbek/Turkmen solidarity) regard taliban as a threat and have known as well as secret protocols with non Pashtun population as well as some Pashtun groups about the contingency of US withdrawal from Afghanistan.From what I have assessed there is a general consensus in the above group not to allow a resurgent post US withdrawal Taliban to advance beyond the line SHINDAND-DAIKUNDI-BAMIYAN-KABUL so as to safeguard interests of non Pashtun/moderate Pashtun/Shia population of Afghanistan.
  3. it is a fallacy thus to think that Taliban will get a clean run in case of US withdrawal right till Oxus River.
  4. Presently 90 % of Taliban are Pakistan linked/Pro Pakistan as they depend for logistics on Quetta/Pakistani Balochistan.Only some 10 % are in conflict with Pakistani state in FATA and under US drone attacks.However there is a danger that in post US withdrawal situation these good and bad taliban can unite and impose their extremist life view on pakistans western provinces.
  5. since the non pashtun and shia population is solidly against taliban the bloc referred to above will always have supporters in afghanistan.this means some 45 % non of total population of non pashtuns and some 15 to 20 % non pashtuns who are moderate.
  6. Hard core taliban do not exceed 15 % of afghanistans population with a 30 to 35 % silent majority who they can manipulate.
  7. instead of beating the indian drum pakistan should seek trade concessions from afghanistan allowing pakistani trucks free movement to all borders of afghanistan with central asia and iran and a visa free regime while allowing afghan trucks similar concessions and also allow indian trucks free transit through pakistan on the condition that india allows pakistani trucks free transit through india to bangladesh,nepal,burma and sri lanka.
  8. in addition pakistan should prevail on the taliban under pakistani influence to respect/guarantee rights of non pashtuns/shias/ismailis.All regarded as sub humans by taliban.

agha 

 
On Tue, Feb 9, 2010 at 5:30 PM, Usman Khalid <usmankhalid@lisauk.com> wrote:
 

The audacity of Afghan peace hopes

 

M.K. Bhadrakumar

 

(The former Indian diplomat helps understand why India is so eager to resume a dialogue with Pakistan that was suspended in the wake of Mumbai attack. Pakistan's forthright stand that India must be kept out of Afghanistan has been listened to; India wants presence in Afghanistan only to make trouble for Pakistan. By offering to resume dialogue with Pakistan , the Indian Government wishes to use its main asset in Pakistan – President Zardari – to sponsor India's inclusion in ' peace talks' on Afghanistan.  But it is already evident that India does not want the USA and ISAF to withdraw from Afghanistan. Would the US policy be dictated by India in South-Central Asia as it has been by Israel in the Middle East? + Usman Khalid +)

Last Thursday the region took a ride in the raft of optimism to peace. The London conference on the Afghan problem certainly gives grounds for optimism. From the Indian perspective, however, what matters most is to be able to behold just in time that, as the Old Testament says, "there ariseth a little cloud out of the sea, like a man's hand." The little cloud is destined to rise higher and higher and become larger and larger with astonishing celerity and will burst in a deluge of rain on the parched earth. And like Elijah hastening Ahab home, India needs to head for the chariot and "get thee down that the rain stop thee not." For, once the river Kishon gets swollen from the deep layer of dust in the arid plain being turned into thick mud that impedes the wheels, it becomes impassable.

The fact of the matter is that the decisions of the London conference not only constitute a 5-year road map for conflict resolution in Afghanistan but are destined to impact on regional security and stability for a long time to come. The decisions run on four different but inter-connected templates. First and foremost, what seemed to some a heretic idea until recently has come to habitate the centerpiece of the political agenda, namely, that the war needs to be brought to an end by "reintegrating" and "reconciling" the Taliban in the Afghan national mainstream. Second, whatever residual war effort remains will focus on persuading or coercing the Taliban to negotiate. Third, the so-called "Afghanisation" process will be speeded up so that by July next year the drawdown of American forces in Afghanistan can commence. Fourth, enduring peace in the Hindu Kush can be attained only in a regional environment in which Afghanistan's neighbours cooperate by setting aside their competing rivalries and by resolving their outstanding disputes.

Clearly, to use the U.S. Defence Secretary's words, the Taliban now form part of Afghanistan's "political fabric". On the eve of the London conference, the United Nations Security Council removed the names of five Taliban leaders from the "black list" of 144 dangerous terrorists figuring in the sanctions regime under Resolution 1267 dating back to the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington. Admittedly, the wheel has come full circle. As the U.N. envoy to Afghanistan put it, "If you want results, then you have to talk to the relevant person in authority. I think the time has come to do it."

For the Pakistan-hating, China-bashing veterans of our strategic community, all this must have come as a stunning bolt from the blue. But they are only at fault. The Indian strategic thinkers should not have been such incorrigible fundamentalists to fail to appreciate the shades of political Islam or discern the western propaganda about the Taliban. Mixing up the Taliban completely with the adversarial mindset of the Pakistani security agencies was equally wrong. Overlooking the indigenous roots of a homegrown movement was always injudicious. The triumphalism over Taliban's ouster in 2001 was unwarranted, as it was never in doubt that such a grassroots movement cannot be expected to simply fade away in the Afghan-Pakistani political landscape; a return of the native was inevitable. Lastly, the U.S. intervention in 2001 was quintessentially a contrived revenge act on the part of the George W. Bush administration precipitated by a cataclysmic backdrop unparalleled in America's history; to be sure, the world community condoned it but as time passed, it lost its "raison d'etre" and became hard to justify.

The Indian foreign and security policy establishment too owes an explanation why Prime Minister was misled to make such extremist viewpoints regarding the Afghanistan situation during his November visit to the U.S. Despite our claim to be "natural allies" of the U.S., we were either not taken into full confidence by Washington, or we couldn't read Barack Obama's mind. Worse still, we couldn't fathom the enormity of the drain of U.S. global influence.

Where did the establishment go wrong? First, our flawed Afghan policy stands exposed. It has a thirteen-year old history. It was circa 1997-98 that Delhi probably began sliding into a strategic mistake by regarding Afghanistan as a theatre of India-Pakistan rivalry. That was a reversal of the Indian policy, which was best evident during the 1992-95 period when despite overtures from the Mujahideen, the Narasimha Rao government stubbornly refused to get involved in any form in Afghanistan's fratricidal strife — although the temptation to pay Pakistan back in the same coin for the low-intensity war in J&K (and the Valley was witnessing incessant bloodshed at that time) was always lurking in the shadows. The level-headed estimation in South Block was that India-Pakistan differences were already far too vexed and blood-soaked to add yet another dimension to them.

Pakistan has special interests in Afghanistan — just as India would have in Nepal or Sri Lanka — with which it shares a 2,500-kilometre-long border with sub-nationalities straddling the border regions inextricably tied by bonds of culture, religion and social kinship. Forever will the Pakistani ties remain the number one foreign policy priority for any government in Kabul. Yet India got so entangled in the Hindu Kush that Pentagon spokesman last week openly demanded "transparency" regarding Delhi's intentions. We overreached. A good beginning lies in the government picking up the threads of the discussions in Sharm Al-Sheikh and transparently addressing Pakistani concerns regarding Baluchistan. The cornerstones of India's Afghan policy are unshakeable. The issue at the moment is to introspect whether we unwittingly came to erect a grotesque structure during the past decade.

Secondly, the impasse of India's current near-total isolation as the international community surges ahead with the engagement of the Taliban exposes a few highly disturbing salients regarding our recent foreign policy postulates. One, contrary to our claim, Pakistan's geopolitical positioning is superb, as testified by the star participants at the regional conference hosted by Turkey on January 26 from which India was pointedly excluded at Islamabad's instance — Afghanistan, Russia, China, Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and the U.S. and Britain. The London conference underscored that the prospects of the reconciliation with the Taliban critically depended on Pakistan's cooperation. It couldn't have been otherwise.

Two, Delhi is paying a price for putting all eggs in the American basket. The U.S. is entitled to look after its national interests. The spectre that is haunting Washington today cannot be overstated: a prolonged war in Afghanistan is unsustainable financially, materially and politically; the NATO allies lack faith in the U.S.'s war strategy; domestic public opposition to the war is cascading in the western countries; the war has become an Albatross' cross hindering the optimal pursuit of U.S. global strategies in a highly volatile international situation posing multiple challenges; the war radicalises the Muslim opinion worldwide and pits America against Islam. India could have anticipated that the U.S. was reaching the end of the tether and was pondering what lay ahead.

What lies ahead? Make no mistake that the Taliban are returning to Afghanistan's power structure — quite plausibly, under Mullah Omar's leadership. The U.S. expectation to "split" the Taliban will likely prove misplaced. As months ebb away, fighting intensifies and Omar in no particular hurry, Washington's pleas to Islamabad will become more and more insistent to bring the so-called Quetta Shura to the negotiating table. Pakistan (or, more appropriately, Pakistani military) will have the option to cooperate or lapse into sophistry and claim helplessness. How the Pakistani military chooses to play will almost entirely depend on the pound of flesh it can extract from the U.S. At a minimum, there will be an India-dimension to it — thanks to our flawed Afghan policy and our failure to develop diversified consultations with like-minded countries such as China, Iran and Russia that have high stakes in regional security and stability. The silver lining is that once in power, the "Afghan-ness" of the Taliban is bound to surface. (India still has hopes. Ed)

Finally, it all boils down to one single core issue. There is no alternative to the "Sharm Al-Sheikh approach" to address the India-Pakistan relationship. The government got unduly fazed by the charge of the Indian light brigade and valuable time was lost. When it is clear that jingoism is a road to nowhere, the leadership should have drawn the line. The London conference underlined that international opinion is heavily weighed against waging wars — leave alone simultaneous wars on two fronts. India can learn lessons from the annals of modern diplomacy: how adversaries incrementally became joint stakeholders in cooperation by pursuing creative ideas and initiatives. France and Germany; Germany and Russia; Turkey and Greece — they were locked in deathly embraces one way or another in modern history. The best way ahead for India is to emulate their example, which is that when erstwhile adversaries become stakeholders in shared enterprise, it renders obsolete their historical antipathies and autarchic mentalities.

(The writer is a former Indian diplomat.)

 
 
--
Man would indeed be in a poor way if he had to be restrained by fear of punishment and hope of reward after death."  --
Albert Einstein !!!
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 



--
Man would indeed be in a poor way if he had to be restrained by fear of punishment and hope of reward after death."  --
Albert Einstein !!!

http://www.scribd.com/doc/22151765/History-of-Pakistan-Army-from-1757-to-1971

http://www.scribd.com/doc/21693873/Indo-Pak-Wars-1947-71-A-STRATEGIC-AND-OPERATIONAL-ANALYSIS-BY-A-H-AMIN

http://www.scribd.com/doc/21686885/TALIBAN-WAR-IN-AFGHANISTAN

http://www.scribd.com/doc/22455178/Letters-to-Command-and-Staff-College-Quetta-Citadel-Journal

http://www.scribd.com/doc/23150027/Pakistan-Army-through-eyes-of-Pakistani-Generals

http://www.scribd.com/doc/23701412/War-of-Independence-of-1857

http://www.scribd.com/doc/22457862/Pakistan-Army-Journal-The-Citadel

http://www.scribd.com/doc/21952758/1971-India-Pakistan-War

http://www.scribd.com/doc/25171703/BOOK-REVIEWS-BY-AGHA-H-AMIN

Monday, February 8, 2010

thoughts on the prevalent utter pakistani nonsense about taliban and afghanistan

thoughts on the prevalent utter pakistani
nonsense about taliban and afghanistan

agha h amin

i dont think that waziristan operation has succeeded
indian factor remains strong in afghanistan.

whatever USA/NATO may do India/Iran/Russia will
frustrate the attempts to bring peace in Afghanistan as per NATO desires

why should NATO and USA allowed to succeed with dirty stone age saudi support when
NATO Saudi Arabia and Pakistans clown Zia conspired to make sure that
the USSR failed in Afghanistan ?

the simple thing is that the afghan war is a war of neighbouring countries
paying glorified procurers and pimps fighting in name of islam.the afghan mujahideen
were fuelled by dollars and the taliban are fuelled by dollars.
 
it is a fallacy to think that only prostitutes and pimps were motivated by money or aroused by verbal communication.

the dangerous part is that pakistani military are cultivating good taliban who are 90 % of taliban and fighting bad taliban who are 10 %.

while theoretically this classification is neat and sound ,
practically it is dangerous because at some stage good and bad taliban will unite.
then they would destroy the pakistani state and will have the potential to destabilise
the whole region from china to europe and even the naieve americas


when the both combine and they shall , they will be lethal and undefeatable

 



--
Man would indeed be in a poor way if he had to be restrained by fear of punishment and hope of reward after death."  --
Albert Einstein !!!

http://www.scribd.com/doc/22151765/History-of-Pakistan-Army-from-1757-to-1971

http://www.scribd.com/doc/21693873/Indo-Pak-Wars-1947-71-A-STRATEGIC-AND-OPERATIONAL-ANALYSIS-BY-A-H-AMIN

http://www.scribd.com/doc/21686885/TALIBAN-WAR-IN-AFGHANISTAN

http://www.scribd.com/doc/22455178/Letters-to-Command-and-Staff-College-Quetta-Citadel-Journal

http://www.scribd.com/doc/23150027/Pakistan-Army-through-eyes-of-Pakistani-Generals

http://www.scribd.com/doc/23701412/War-of-Independence-of-1857

http://www.scribd.com/doc/22457862/Pakistan-Army-Journal-The-Citadel

http://www.scribd.com/doc/21952758/1971-India-Pakistan-War

http://www.scribd.com/doc/25171703/BOOK-REVIEWS-BY-AGHA-H-AMIN

The Pakistan Military Proves its Mettle

 

 

ISA S Brief

No. 155 – Date: 8 February 2010

 

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Email: isassec@nus.edu.sg

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The Pakistan Military Proves its Mettle

Ishtiaq Ahmed[1]

 

Abstract

 

It is argued in this brief that the recent London conference on the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan was a major success for the Pakistani military in convincing the international community that its cooperation is vital to resolving the crisis in Afghanistan. It was achieved in light of the fact that the Pakistani military effectively combated Taliban terrorism on its own soil. The Pakistani military has also come out against the Taliban domination of Afghanistan in case of an early United States (US) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) troop pullout, because it would threaten Pakistani security and national interests.

 

Introduction

 

Considerable attention has been given to the conference hosted by United Kingdom's Prime Minister Gordon Brown at Lancaster House on 28-29 January 2010 in London in which nearly 70 countries, including the United Nations, backed a US$500 million Afghan government drive to tempt fighters to give up their weapons in exchange for jobs and other incentives. Before the conference took place, brisk diplomatic moves were underway in Istanbul and London to garner the support of important players such as China, Turkey, Iran and Russia. It was realised that Pakistan was the key player in any peace deal in Afghanistan.

 

It dawned upon the American and the British – the two major powers involved in fighting the Taliban – that only military action would not do. In recent years the Taliban, who are almost all from the Pukhtun ethnic group, have expanded their influence outside the traditional Pukhtun strongholds of eastern and southern Afghanistan. They are reportedly present in almost all parts of the country, though it does not mean they exercise real power in them. The US and Allied Forces troop surge that is to bring more than 35,000 soldiers has been qualified by President Obama's statement  that the US will start pulling back its troops from the summer of 2011.

 

US top commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, remarked recently that as a soldier he felt that it was time to find another way of dealing with the insurgency in Afghanistan.[2] The idea is that by mid-2011 the Afghan military and security forces should be large enough and trained properly to take over the responsibilities of maintaining the peace, and law and order. In any event, hectic consultations with President Hamid Karzai and other leaders had convinced the West that it was possible to strike a deal with sections of the Taliban who were not hardcore ideological fanatics.

 

The general understanding is that it is a major victory for Pakistan, as its point of view that not all Taliban were bad was accepted. Equally, it has been seen as a major setback to India, which had insisted all along that the Taliban as a whole had to be defeated because they were committed to an ideology that was rabidly militaristic and expansionist, and any concession to them would gravely threaten India's security. Such India-Pakistan sabre rattling in Afghanistan is symptomatic of their zero-sum postures on almost all security matters. The reality, however, is always more complicated and complex than what meets the eye.

 

Now, doubts are being expressed about the wisdom of such optimism about striking a deal with the Taliban. The Taliban have not responded to President Karzai's invitation to Taliban leaders to attend the traditional consultative assembly, the Loya Jirga. Karzai is travelling to Saudi Arabia to seek its influence in convincing the Taliban to attend the Loya Jirga. The Saudis are reportedly making it conditional to the Taliban openly declaring that they will part company with Al-Qaeda.

 

Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Pervaiz Kayani has stated, 'Pakistan doesn't want a "talibanised" Pakistan'.[3] Elaborating that point, he said that Pakistan did not want for Afghanistan what it did not want for itself. Further, he stated that his country had no intention of controlling Afghanistan. He offered Pakistan's assistance and help in training the Afghan military. He also made the important point that Pakistan's geostrategic location continues to be relevant in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 periods. He urged NATO to fully appreciate that objective reality.

 

Wahid Mujdah, a writer who served in the Afghan Foreign Ministry under the Taliban, has expressed his scepticism in the following words, 'These efforts will not bear fruit. I do not see any change, because the Taliban are abiding by their old stance and I cannot see anything new on the part of Karzai either'.[4]


Another doubtful voice is that of Daniel Korski of the European Council on Foreign Relation. 'Expectations stirred in London of a quick breakthrough in talks with senior militants are too rosy. The London conference was almost delusional in its optimism. Let's reject the idea that negotiations will happen according to a timetable that we find convenient. Let's reject the idea that 2010 is a make-or-break year. If the West and Karzai want the Taliban to negotiate, they will first need to score victories on the battlefield, improve the capabilities of the Afghan government and to weaken Taliban unity with well-run reintegration programmes', said Korski.[5]

 

At any rate, Pakistan has demonstrated that it can defeat the Taliban terrorists and put them on the run. The Taliban have been expelled from Swat and South Waziristan. Since May 2009, General Kayani, has been demonstrating an unwavering resolve to defeat the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. The Pakistan military fought pitched battles with the Taliban. The latter retaliated by vicious suicide bombings and other acts of terror that have claimed 3,021 lives and caused injury to 7,334 people last year.[6] The fact remains that the Pakistan military would never allow the Taliban to capture power in Pakistan. General McChrystal admitted some weeks earlier that the trust deficit between the US and Pakistan had begun to diminish.[7]

 

It is also commonsense to recognise that breaking the power of the Taliban in Afghanistan can be more successful if Pakistan's interests in Afghanistan are properly recognised. It remains the paramount power in south-west Asia. President Obama has given Pakistan an additional US$0.5 billion increase in military aid.[8] This despite the fact that the Pakistani Army spokesperson Major General Athar Abbas announced some days ago that they will be no major offensive for the next six to 12 months.[9]

 

General Kayani also demonstrated another resolution that he adhered to with great consistency – to let the political process in Pakistan take its natural course. Sensational media reports and conspiracy theorists predicted a military coup that never took place.  Under the circumstances, the point seems to be that a strong military in Pakistan does not preclude per definition a civilian and democratic government. It is, of course, too soon to jump to any conclusions. The military is and will remain the most powerful institution in Pakistan – for both bad and good.

 

India has started to recover from the shock that its standpoint on the Taliban was ignored at the London Conference. "World Rejects India's stand" wrote Ashis Ray of the Times of India.[10] Foreign Minister SM Krishna issued a statement that his country can do business with the Taliban provided they fulfil three preconditions: acceptance of the Afghan constitution, severing connections with Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, and renunciation of violence. 'If the Taliban are accepted in the mainstream of Afghan politics and society, we could do business', asserted Krishna.[11] President Karzai has all along been very appreciative of India's help and assistance and India enjoyed considerable goodwill among the Northern Alliance old guard. Now, if the moderate Taliban return to the mainstream and are accommodated in the government it will mean reduced stature for India in Afghanistan.

 

It is the duty of the West to stay on as long as is needed to capture or eliminate Al-Qaeda and the hardcore Taliban leadership. Most Taliban would abandon their leaders and ideology only when it is demonstrated to them that they have no chance of prevailing in Afghanistan militarily. A premature exit could mean chaos and civil war in Afghanistan that can destabilise not only Pakistan but also India. The 35,000-plus troop surge will have to be used to inflict severe punishment and defeat on the Al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership. If that is not achieved then the rational basis for beginning the troop pullout will be undermined.

 

It is also important that India and Pakistan show maturity and vision. It should be perfectly possible to accommodate India's continuing participation in the reconstruction and developmental projects while Pakistan takes care of training the Afghan military. Pakistan's centrality to facilitating peace and stability in Afghanistan need not be over-emphasised. A division of tasks between India and Pakistan would in no way hurt their vital interests in Afghanistan. They may also learn the vital lesson that they gain more from cooperation than confrontation.

 

 

 

oooOOOooo

 







[1]     Professor Ishtiaq Ahmed is a Visiting Research Professor at the Institute of South Asian Studies, an autonomous research institute at the National University of Singapore. He can be contacted at isasia@nus.edu.sg.

[2]    Financial Times, London, 24 January 2010.

[3]   Daily Times, Lahore, 2 February 2010.

[4]   Daily Times, Lahore, 2 February 2010.

[5]   Daily Times, Lahore, 2 February 2010.

[6]   Pakistan Security Report 2009, Islamabad: Pakistan Institute for Peace Research,  p. 4.

[7]   Daily Times, Lahore, 5 January 2010.

[8]   Daily Times, Lahore, 2 February 2010.

[9]   Dawn, Karachi, 22 January 2010.

[10]  The Times of India, New Delhi, 29 January 2010.

[11]  Daily Times, Lahore, 31 January 2010.



--
Man would indeed be in a poor way if he had to be restrained by fear of punishment and hope of reward after death."  --
Albert Einstein !!!

http://www.scribd.com/doc/22151765/History-of-Pakistan-Army-from-1757-to-1971

http://www.scribd.com/doc/21693873/Indo-Pak-Wars-1947-71-A-STRATEGIC-AND-OPERATIONAL-ANALYSIS-BY-A-H-AMIN

http://www.scribd.com/doc/21686885/TALIBAN-WAR-IN-AFGHANISTAN

http://www.scribd.com/doc/22455178/Letters-to-Command-and-Staff-College-Quetta-Citadel-Journal

http://www.scribd.com/doc/23150027/Pakistan-Army-through-eyes-of-Pakistani-Generals

http://www.scribd.com/doc/23701412/War-of-Independence-of-1857

http://www.scribd.com/doc/22457862/Pakistan-Army-Journal-The-Citadel

http://www.scribd.com/doc/21952758/1971-India-Pakistan-War

http://www.scribd.com/doc/25171703/BOOK-REVIEWS-BY-AGHA-H-AMIN

Sunday, February 7, 2010

Why India Pakistan Talks Cannot succeed

Why India Pakistan Talks Cannot succeed
 
1-Pakistans India policy and security policy is run by the Pakistani military.All talks or pretence of talks with India is a facade.
 
2-Pakistans Political leadership has no control on Pakistans security policy.
 
3-Both India and Pakistan are fighting an undeclared proxy war since 1947.
 
4-India thinks that Pakistani first strike doctrine poses a pre war threat to India and unless Pakistan is denuclearised India remains under threat.
 
5-It is not in institutional interest of Pakistani generals to have peace with India.
 
 



--
Man would indeed be in a poor way if he had to be restrained by fear of punishment and hope of reward after death."  --
Albert Einstein !!!

http://www.scribd.com/doc/22151765/History-of-Pakistan-Army-from-1757-to-1971

http://www.scribd.com/doc/21693873/Indo-Pak-Wars-1947-71-A-STRATEGIC-AND-OPERATIONAL-ANALYSIS-BY-A-H-AMIN

http://www.scribd.com/doc/21686885/TALIBAN-WAR-IN-AFGHANISTAN

http://www.scribd.com/doc/22455178/Letters-to-Command-and-Staff-College-Quetta-Citadel-Journal

http://www.scribd.com/doc/23150027/Pakistan-Army-through-eyes-of-Pakistani-Generals

http://www.scribd.com/doc/23701412/War-of-Independence-of-1857

http://www.scribd.com/doc/22457862/Pakistan-Army-Journal-The-Citadel

http://www.scribd.com/doc/21952758/1971-India-Pakistan-War

http://www.scribd.com/doc/25171703/BOOK-REVIEWS-BY-AGHA-H-AMIN

Could Pakistan 2010 Go the Way of Cambodia 1969? - Destabilizing Pakistan


 
 Destabilizing Pakistan
 
by Pratap Chatterjee,
Posted by Pratap Chatterjee at 10:00pm, February 7, 2010.

Almost every day, reports come back from the CIA's "secret" battlefield in the Pakistani tribal borderlands.  Unmanned Aerial Vehicles -- that is, pilot-less drones -- shoot missiles (18 of themin a single attack on a tiny village last week) or drop bombs and then the news comes in:  a certain number of al-Qaeda or Taliban leaders or suspected Arab or Uzbek or Afghan "militants"have died.  The numbers are often remarkably precise.  Sometimes they are attributed to U.S. sources, sometimes to the Pakistanis; sometimes, it's hard to tell where the information comes from.  In the Pakistani press, on the other hand, the numbers that come back are usually of civilian dead.  They, too, tend to be precise

Don't let that precision fool you.  Here's the reality:  There are no reporters on the ground and none of these figures can be taken as accurate.  Let's just consider the CIA side of things.  Any information that comes from American sources (i.e. the CIA) has to be looked at with great wariness.  As a start, the CIA's history is one of deception.  There's no reason to take anything its sources say at face value.  They will report just what they think it's in their interest to report -- and the ongoing "success" of their drone strikes is distinctly in their interest. 

Then, there's history.  In the present drone wars, as in the CIA's bloody Phoenix Program in the Vietnam era, the Agency's operatives, working in distinctly alien terrain, must rely on local sources (or possibly official Pakistani ones) for targeting intelligence.  In Vietnam in the 1960s, the Agency's Phoenix Program -- reportedly responsible for the assassination of 20,000 Vietnamese -- became, according to historian Marilyn Young, "an extortionist's paradise, with payoffs as available for denunciation as for protection."  Once again, the CIA is reportedly passing out bags of money and anyone on the ground with a grudge, or the desire to eliminate an enemy, or simply the desire to make some of that money can undoubtedly feed information into the system, watch the drones do their damnedest, and then report back that more "terrorists" are dead.  Just assume that at least some of those "militants" dying in Pakistan, and possibly many of them, aren't who the CIA hopes they are.

Think of it as a foolproof situation, with an emphasis on the "fool."  And then keep in mind that, in December, the CIA's local brain trust, undoubtedly the same people who were leaking precise news of "successes" in Pakistan, mistook a jihadist double agent from Jordan for an agent of theirs, gathered at an Agency base in Khost, Afghanistan, and let him wipe them out with a suicide bomb.  Seven CIA operatives died, including the base chief. This should give us a grim clue as to the accuracy of the CIA's insights into what's happening on the ground in Pakistan, or into the real effects of their 24/7 robotic assassination program. 

But there's a deeper, more dangerous level of deception in Washington's widening war in the region: self-deception.  The CIA drone program, which the Agency's Director Leon Panetta has called "the only game in town" when it comes to dismantling al-Qaeda, is just symptomatic of such self-deception.  While the CIA and the U.S. military have been expending enormous effort studying the Afghan and Pakistani situations and consulting experts, and while the White House has conducted an extensive series of seminars-cum-policy-debates on both countries, you can count on one thing: none of them have spent significant time studying or thinking about us. 

As a result, the seeming cleanliness and effectiveness of the drone-war solution undoubtedly only reinforces a sense in Washington that the world's last great military power can still control this war -- that it can organize, order, prod, wheedle, and bribe both the Afghans and Pakistanis into doing what's best, and if that doesn't work, simply continue raining down the missiles and bombs.  Beware Washington's deep-seated belief that it controls events; that it is, however precariously, in the saddle; that, as Afghan War commander General Stanley McChrystal recently put it, there is a "corner" to "turn" out there, even if we haven't quite turned it yet. 

In fact, Washington is not in the saddle and that corner, if there, if turned, will have its own unpleasant surprises.  Washington is, in this sense, as oblivious as those CIA operatives were as they waited for "their" Jordanian agent to give them supposedly vital information on the al-Qaeda leadership in the Pakistani tribal areas.  Like their drones, the Americans in charge of this war are desperately far from the ground, and they don't even seem to know it.  It's this that makes the analogy drawn by TomDispatch regular and author of Halliburton's Army, Pratap Chatterjee, so unnerving.  It's time for Washington to examine not what we know about them, but what we don't know about ourselves.  Tom

Operation Breakfast Redux 
Could Pakistan 2010 Go the Way of Cambodia 1969? 
By Pratap Chatterjee

Sitting in air-conditioned comfort, cans of Coke and 7-Up within reach as they watched their screens, the ground controllers gave the order to strike under the cover of darkness. There had been no declaration of war.  No advance warning, nothing, in fact, that would have alerted the "enemy" to the sudden, unprecedented bombing raids. The secret computer-guided strikes were authorized by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, just weeks after a new American president entered the Oval Office.  They represented an effort to wipe out the enemy's central headquarters whose location intelligence experts claimed to have pinpointed just across the border from the war-torn land where tens of thousands of American troops were fighting daily.

In remote villages where no reporters dared to go, far from the battlefields where Americans were dying, who knew whether the bombs that rained from the night sky had killed high-level insurgents or innocent civilians? For 14 months the raids continued and, after each one was completed, the commander of the bombing crews was instructed to relay a one-sentence message: "The ball game is over."

The campaign was called "Operation Breakfast," and, while it may sound like the CIA's present air campaign over Pakistan, it wasn't. You need to turn the clock back to another American war, four decades earlier, to March 18, 1969, to be exact.  The target was an area of Cambodia known as the Fish Hook that jutted into South Vietnam, and Operation Breakfast would be but the first of dozens of top secret bombing raids.  Later ones were named "Lunch," "Snack," and "Supper," and they went under the collective label "Menu." They were authorized by President Richard Nixon and were meant to destroy a (non-existent) "Bamboo Pentagon," a central headquarters in the Cambodian borderlands where North Vietnamese communists were supposedly orchestrating raids deep into South Vietnam.

Like President Obama today, Nixon had come to power promising stability in an age of unrest and with a vague plan to bringing peace to a nation at war. On the day he was sworn in, he read from the Biblical book of Isaiah: "They shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks." He also spoke of transforming Washington's bitter partisan politics into a new age of unity: "We cannot learn from one another until we stop shouting at one another, until we speak quietly enough so that our words can be heard as well as our voices."

Return to the Killing Fields

In recent years, many commentators and pundits have resorted to "the Vietnam analogy," comparing first the American war in Iraq and now in Afghanistan to the Vietnam War. Despite a number of similarities, the analogy disintegrates quickly enough if you consider that U.S. military campaigns in post-invasion Afghanistan and Iraq against small forces of lightly-armed insurgents bear little resemblance to the large-scale war that Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard Nixon waged against both southern revolutionary guerrillas and the military of North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh, who commanded a real army, with the backing of, and supplies from, the Soviet Union and China.

A more provocative -- and perhaps more ominous -- analogy today might be between the CIA's escalating drone war in the contemporary Pakistani tribal borderlands and Richard Nixon's secret bombing campaign against the Cambodian equivalent.  To briefly recapitulate that ancient history: In the late 1960s, Cambodia was ruled by a "neutralist" king, Norodom Sihanouk, leading a weak government that had little relevance to its poor and barely educated citizens. In its borderlands, largely beyond its control, the North Vietnamese and Vietcong found "sanctuaries." 

Sihanouk, helpless to do anything, looked the other way.  In the meantime, sheltered by local villagers in distant areas of rural Cambodia was a small insurgent group, little-known communist fundamentalists who called themselves the Khmer Rouge.  (Think of them as the 1970s equivalent of the Pakistani Taliban who have settled into the wild borderlands of that country largely beyond the control of the Pakistani government.)  They were then weak and incapable of challenging Sihanouk -- until, that is, those secret bombing raids by American B-52s began.  As these intensified in the summer of 1969, areas of the country began to destabilize (helped on in 1970 by a U.S.-encouraged military coup in the capital Phnom Penh), and the Khmer Rouge began to gain strength.

You know the grim end of that old story. 

Forty years, almost to the day, after Operation Breakfast began, I traveled to the town of Snuol, close to where the American bombs once fell. It is a quiet town, no longer remote, as modern roads and Chinese-led timber companies have systematically cut down the jungle that once sheltered anti-government rebels. I went in search of anyone who remembered the bombing raids, only to discover that few there were old enough to have been alive at the time, largely because the Khmer Rouge executed as much as a quarter of the total Cambodian population after they took power in 1975.

Eventually, a 15-minute ride out of town, I found an old soldier living by himself in a simple one-room house adorned with pictures of the old king, Sihanouk. His name was Kong Kan and he had first moved to the nearby town of Memot in 1960. A little further away, I ran into three more old men, Choenung Klou, Keo Long, and Hoe Huy, who had gathered at a newly built temple to chat.

All of them remembered the massive 1969 B-52 raids vividly and the arrival of U.S. troops the following year. "We thought the Americans had come to help us," said Choenung Klou. "But then they left and the [South] Vietnamese soldiers who came with them destroyed the villages and raped the women."

He had no love for the North Vietnamese communists either. "They would stay at people's houses, take our hammocks and food. We didn't like them and we were afraid of them."

Caught between two Vietnamese armies and with American planes carpet-bombing the countryside, increasing numbers of Cambodians soon came to believe that the Khmer Rouge, who were their countrymen, might help them. Like the Taliban of today, many of the Khmer Rouge were, in fact, teenaged villagers who had responded, under the pressure of war and disruption, to the distant call of an inspirational ideology and joined the resistance in the jungles.

"If you ask me why I joined the Khmer Rouge, the main reason is because of the American invasion," Hun Sen, the current prime minister of Cambodia, has said. "If there was no invasion, by now, I would be a pilot or a professor."

Six years after the bombings of Cambodia began, shortly after the last helicopter lifted off the U.S. embassy in Saigon and the flow of military aid to the crumbling government of Cambodia stopped, a reign of terror took hold in the capital, Phnom Penh.

The Khmer Rouge left the jungles and entered the capital where they began a systemic genocide against city dwellers and anyone who was educated. They vowed to restart history at Year Zero, a new era in which much of the past became irrelevant. Some two million people are believed to have died from executions, starvation, and forced labor in the camps established by the Angkar leadership of the Khmer Rouge commanded by Pol Pot.

Unraveling Pakistan

Could the same thing happen in Pakistan today? A new American president was ordering escalating drone attacks, in a country where no war has been declared, at the moment when I flew from Cambodia across South Asia to Afghanistan, so this question loomed large in my mind.  Both there and just across the border, Operation Breakfast seems to be repeating itself.

In the Afghan capital, Kabul, I met earnest aid workers who drank late into the night in places like L'Atmosphere, a foreigner-only bar that could easily have doubled as a movie set for Saigon in the 1960s. Like modern-day equivalents of Graham Greene's "quiet American," these "consultants" describe a Third Way that is neither Western nor fundamentalist Islam.

At the very same time, CIA analysts in distant Virginia are using pilot-less drones and satellite technology to order strikes against supposed terrorist headquarters across the border in Pakistan.  They are not so unlike the military men who watched radar screens in South Vietnam in the 1960s as the Cambodian air raids went on.

In 2009, on the orders of President Obama, the U.S. unloaded more missiles and bombs on Pakistan than President Bush did in the years of his secret drone war, and the strikes have been accelerating in number and intensity.  By this January, there was a drone attack almost every other day. Even if, this time around, no one is using the code phrase, "the ball game is over," Washington continually hails success after success, terrorist leader after terrorist leader killed, implying that something approaching victory could be somewhere just over the horizon. 

As in the 1960s in Cambodia, these strikes are, in actuality, having a devastating, destabilizing effect in Pakistan, not just on the targeted communities, but on public consciousness throughout the region. An article in the January 23rd New York Times indicated that the fury over these attacks has even spread into Pakistan's military establishment which, in a manner similar to Sihanouk in the 1960s, knows its limits in its tribal borderlands and is publicly uneasy about U.S. air strikes which undermine the country's sovereignty. "Are you with us or against us?" the newspaper quoted a senior Pakistani military officer demanding of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates when he spoke last month at Pakistan's National Defense University.

Even pro-American Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani has spoken out publicly against drone strikes.  Of one such attack, he recently told reporters, "We strongly condemn this attack and the government will raise this issue at [the] diplomatic level."

Despite the public displays of outrage, however, the American strikes have undoubtedly been tacitly approved at the highest levels of the Pakistani government because of that country's inability to control militants in its tribal borderlands.  Similarly, Sihanouk finally looked the other way after the U.S. provided secret papers, code-named Vesuvius, as proof that the Vietnamese were operating from his country.

While most Democratic and Republican hawks have praised the growing drone war in the skies over Pakistan, some experts in the U.S. are starting to express worries about them (even if they don't have the Cambodian analogy in mind). For example, John Arquilla, a professor of defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School who frequently advises the military, says that an expansion of the drone strikes "might even spark a social revolution in Pakistan."

Indeed, even General David Petraeus, head of U.S. Central Command, wrote in a secret assessment on May 27, 2009: "Anti-U.S. sentiment has already been increasing in Pakistan… especially in regard to cross-border and reported drone strikes, which Pakistanis perceive to cause unacceptable civilian casualties." Quoting local polls, he wrote: "35 percent [of Pakistanis] say they do not support U.S. strikes into Pakistan, even if they are coordinated with the GOP [government of Pakistan] and the Pakistan Military ahead of time."

The Pakistani Army has, in fact, launched several significant operations against the Pakistani Taliban in Swat and in South Waziristan, just as Sihanouk initially ordered the Cambodian military to attack the Khmer Rouge and suppress peasant rebellions in Battambang Province. Again like Sihanouk in the late 1960s, however, the Pakistanis have balked at more comprehensive assaults on the Taliban, and especially on the Afghan Taliban using the border areas as "sanctuaries."

The New Jihadists

What happens next is the $64 million question. Most Pakistani experts dismiss any suggestion that the Taliban has widespread support in their country, but it must be remembered that the Khmer Rouge was a fringe group with no more than 4,000 fighters at the time that Operation Breakfast began.

And if Cambodia's history is any guide to the future, the drone strikes do not have to create a groundswell for revolution. They only have to begin to destabilize Pakistan as would, for instance, the threatened spread of such strikes into the already unsettled province of Baluchistan, or any future American ground incursions into the country. A few charismatic intellectuals like Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot always have the possibility of taking it from there, rallying angry and unemployed youth to create an infrastructure for disruptive change.

Despite often repeated claims by both the Bush and Obama administrations that the drone raids are smashing al-Qaeda's intellectual leadership, more and more educated and disenchanted young men from around the world seem to be rallying to the fundamentalist cause.

Some have struck directly at American targets like Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the 23-year-old Nigerian who attempted to blow up a Detroit-bound plane on Christmas Day 2009, and Dr. Humam Khalil Abu Mulal al-Balawi, the 32-year-old Jordanian double agent and suicide bomber who killed seven CIA operatives at a military base in Khost, southern Afghanistan, five days later.

Some have even been U.S.-born, like Anwar al-Awlaki, the 38-year-old Islamic preacher from New Mexico who has moved to Yemen; Adam Pearlman, a 32-year-old Southern Californian and al-Qaeda spokesman now known as "Azzam the American," who reportedly lives somewhere in the Afghan-Pakistan border regions; and Omar Hammami, the 25-year-old Syrian-American from Alabama believed to be an al-Shabaab leader in Somalia.

Like the Khmer Rouge before them, these new jihadists display no remorse for killing innocent civilians. "One of the sad truths I have come to see is that for this kind of mass violence, you don't need monsters," says Craig Etcheson, author of After the Killing Fields and founder of the Documentation Center of Cambodia. "Ordinary people will do just fine. This thing lives in all of us."

What threw Sihanouk's fragile government into serious disarray -- other than his

Even King Sihanouk, who had once ordered raids against the Khmer Rouge, eventually agreed to support them after he had been overthrown in a coup and was living in exile in China. Could the same thing happen to Pakistani politicians if they fall from grace and U.S. backing?

 own eccentricity and self-absorption -- was the devastating spillover of Nixon's war in Vietnam into Cambodia's border regions. It finally brought the Khmer Rouge to power. 

Pakistan 2010, with its enormous modern military and industrialized base, is hardly impoverished Cambodia 1969.  Nonetheless, in that now ancient history lies both a potential analogy and a cautionary tale.  Beware secret air wars that promise success and yet wreak havoc in lands that are not even enemy nations.

When his war plans were questioned, Nixon pressed ahead, despite a growing public distaste for his war. A similar dynamic seems to be underway today.  In 1970, after Operation Breakfast was revealed by the New York Times, Nixon told his top military and national security aides: "We cannot sit here and let the enemy believe that Cambodia is our last gasp."

Had he refrained first from launching Operation Breakfast and then from supping on the whole "menu," some historians like Etcheson believe a genocide would have been averted. It would be a sad day if the drone strikes, along with the endless war that the Obama administration has inherited and that is now spilling over ever more devastatingly into Pakistan, were to create a new class of fundamentalists who actually had the capacity to seize power.

Pratap Chatterjee is a freelance journalist and senior editor at CorpWatch who has traveled extensively in Afghanistan and Iraq. He has written two books about the war on terror, Iraq, Inc. (Seven Stories Press, 2004) and Halliburton's Army (Nation Books, 2009). For more information on Nixon's secret campaign, he recommends Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia by William Shawcross. (Simon and Schuster, 1979)

Copyright 2010 Pratap Chatterjee




--
Man would indeed be in a poor way if he had to be restrained by fear of punishment and hope of reward after death."  --
Albert Einstein !!!

http://www.scribd.com/doc/22151765/History-of-Pakistan-Army-from-1757-to-1971

http://www.scribd.com/doc/21693873/Indo-Pak-Wars-1947-71-A-STRATEGIC-AND-OPERATIONAL-ANALYSIS-BY-A-H-AMIN

http://www.scribd.com/doc/21686885/TALIBAN-WAR-IN-AFGHANISTAN

http://www.scribd.com/doc/22455178/Letters-to-Command-and-Staff-College-Quetta-Citadel-Journal

http://www.scribd.com/doc/23150027/Pakistan-Army-through-eyes-of-Pakistani-Generals

http://www.scribd.com/doc/23701412/War-of-Independence-of-1857

http://www.scribd.com/doc/22457862/Pakistan-Army-Journal-The-Citadel

http://www.scribd.com/doc/21952758/1971-India-Pakistan-War

http://www.scribd.com/doc/25171703/BOOK-REVIEWS-BY-AGHA-H-AMIN